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ABSTRACT: We develop a model with endogeneity in key features of industrial structure
linked to heterogeneous cost structures under Cournot competition. We use the model to
explore issues related to cross-country dierences in industry structure and the impact of
globalization on markups and pricing, concentration, and productivity. The model nests
two workhorse trade models, the Brander & Krugman reciprocal dumping model and the
Ricardian technology-based trade model, as special cases. We examine both free entry and
limited entry (free exit) cases. The model generates clear testable predictions on the proba-
bility of zero trade 
ows and the pattern of export prices, and on cross-country and industry
variations in industrial structure controlling for openness. Market prices decline as a result
of trade liberalization, the least productive rms get squeezed out of the market, exporting
rms gain market share, and more rms become trade oriented. In addition, depending on
the strength of underlying cost heterogeneity, falling prices are consistent with both increas-
ing and falling industry concentration following episodes of integration. Welfare rises with
trade liberalization, unless trade costs decline from a prohibitive level in the short run free
exit case. Variation across industries and markets in markups, concentration, and pricing
structures is otherwise a function of market size and the variation in cost heterogeneity across
industries.
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ABSTRACT: We develop a model with endogeneity in key features of industrial struc-
ture linked to heterogeneous cost structures under Cournot competition. We use the model
to explore issues related to cross-country dierences in industry structure and the impact
of globalization on markups and pricing, concentration, and productivity. The model nests
two workhorse trade models, the Brander & Krugman reciprocal dumping model and the
Ricardian technology-based trade model, as special cases. We examine both free entry and
limited entry (free exit) cases. The model generates clear testable predictions on the proba-
bility of zero trade 
ows and the pattern of export prices, and on cross-country and industry
variations in industrial structure controlling for openness. Market prices decline as a result
of trade liberalization, the least productive rms get squeezed out of the market, exporting
rms gain market share, and more rms become trade oriented. In addition, depending on
the strength of underlying cost heterogeneity, falling prices are consistent with both increas-
ing and falling industry concentration following episodes of integration. Welfare rises with
trade liberalization, unless trade costs decline from a prohibitive level in the short run free
exit case. Variation across industries and markets in markups, concentration, and pricing
structures is otherwise a function of market size and the variation in cost heterogeneity across
industries.
keywords: Firm heterogeneity, Cournot competition, eects of trade liberalization
JEL codes: L11, L13, F12.
1 Introduction
Research on the impact of globalization on rms has shown that the reallocation eects of
trade are an important mechanism linking openness to productivity. Bernard and Jensen
(2004) nd that almost half of the rise of manufacturing total factor productivity in the USA
between 1983 and 1992 is linked to a reallocation eect of resources towards more productive
and trade oriented rms. Episodes of liberalization in developing countries also show the
importance of changes in rm composition { composition eects (Tybout 2001).
A number of models of heterogeneous productivity have been put forward in the recent
theoretical trade literature to explain composition eects of trade. A standard result is that
processes of rm formation involving heterogeneous cost structures across rms imply bene-
cial reallocation eects from trade liberalization linked to rationalization of the population
of rms. Less ecient rms producing for the domestic market are squeezed out by more
ecient trading rms. For example, Melitz (2003) introduces heterogeneous productivity
in a monopolistic competition framework with CES-preferences, while Bernard, et al (2003)
include heterogeneous productivity in a model with Bertrand competition. Working with
1monopolistic competition models, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) examine linkages be-
tween trade and growth given rm heterogeneity, while Ghironi and Melitz (2007) examine
macroeconomic dynamics. In contrast, in this paper we explore heterogeneous productivity
in a model with oligopoly characterized by Cournot competition. Basic aspects of market
structure { markups, industrial concentration, relative rm positions, and prices for domes-
tic and export markets { are endogenous. They depend on the interaction between the
technology set, market size, and trade openness.
The model we develop is a two-country, multi-sector model of trade under Cournot com-
petition.1 The value added of this approach is threefold. First, the model is parsimonious,
while generating a rich set of results linked to composition eects. This includes welfare
eects of trade liberalization and the endogeneity of market structure. Moreover, we do not
need to assume a specic distribution of productivity, as is the case with Bernard, et al
(2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), to generate our results. Second, the model nests
two workhorse trade models, the Brander and Krugman (1983) reciprocal dumping model
and the Ricardian model, as special cases. Third, the model generates clear testable predic-
tions on the probability of zero trade 
ows and export prices, as well as predictions about
linkages between openness and industrial market structure across industries and countries.
The pattern of zeros and unit values has emerged as a particularly important issue in the
recent empirical trade literature. (See Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Baldwin and Taglioni
2006). In the model developed here, a larger distance between countries leads to a higher
probability of zero trade 
ows and lower fob export prices. The size of the importer country
also in
uences the probability of zero trade 
ows and decreases the fob export price. A
number of other results stand out. In the free entry case, falling trade costs raise welfare
unambiguously. However, in the case without free entry, welfare increases as well only when
certain conditions are placed on the distribution of costs. In addition, falling prices from
trade liberalization can go hand and hand with increased rm concentration. Finally, we
note the possibility of delocation eects with heterogeneous countries. Unilateral liberaliza-
tion then leads to higher market prices in the liberalizing country. All results are derived
without specifying a specic distribution of costs. Preferences are assumed to be CES.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model. Section 3
1Van Long et al. (2007) also address rm heterogeneity in an oligopoly model. Their paper is focused on
a dierent set of issues however, the interaction of trade and R&D.
2goes into the case of trade without free entry and section 4 addresses the case of trade with
free entry. Section 5 explores the heterogeneous countries case. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
This section lays out the basics of the model without trade (or identically for an integrated or
single global economy without trade costs). Industrial concentration emerges endogenously
as a function of the degree of rm heterogeneity and market size, while the relationship of
concentration to price depends on the cost structure of industry.
We start by assume that there are Q + 1 sectors in the economy, oligopolistic Q sectors
producing qj and 1 sector producing z under conditions of perfect competition. In the rst
sections it is assumed that the Cournot sectors are symmetric. Later on this assumption is
relaxed when asymmetries in national technology sets, country size, and policy are explored.
Throughout it is assumed that there are sucient sectors in the economy so that the eect
of a price change on demand through the price index is negligible for rms. (There is no
numeraire problem). There are L equal agents each supplying 1 unit of labor. All prot
income from the Cournot sectors goes to the economic agents. The utility function of each
agent is CES. The optimization problem of the consumer generates the following market









The price of good z is normalized at 1 and I is the endogenous income of all agents, the


















Until we relax out symmetry assumptions, we will focus on one representative Cournot sector.
(We will warn the reader when we drop these assumptions.) This means we can drop the
sector index j for now. Labor is the only factor of production and there is a labor force of
size L. One unit of labor is needed to produce one unit of the perfect competition good y.
3This means the wage is equal to 1. In the q sectors productivity is heterogeneous. One unit
of labor can be transformed into 1=ci units of q for the i-th rm which has marginal cost of
production ci. There are no xed costs of production. Therefore the cost function of rm i
is given by
Ci (qi) = ciqi (4)
There is Cournot competition between the dierent rms in the q-sectors. So, rms maximize
prots towards quantity supplied, taking the quantity supplied by other rms as given. Prot
of rm i is given by:
i = pqi   ciqi (5)















qi: n is the number of rms in the market. Using the rst order condition, the











Using the denition for market share, i =
qi












The marginal revenues on the LHS of equation (9) should be at least as large as the marginal
costs on the RHS. The larger is market share i, the lower is marginal revenue. So, for positive
sales (i  0) which are implicitly imposed, a rm can satisfy the FOC by just reducing its
market share as long as its marginal cost is smaller than the market price. There is a cuto
cost level c with which a rm would just stay in the market. This cuto cost level c is
equal to the market price p. The highest cost rm staying in the market has a cost level
equal or just below the cuto cost level and selling an amount just above zero.
The equilibrium price and quantities sold can be found for a given number of rms. Below
4a free entry condition is added to endogenise the number of rms. Suppose for now there
are n rms. Combining the demand equation in (1) with n rst order conditions in equation
(6) and with the equation for the sum of market shares, one can nd the following solutions

































Using the fact that the price is equal to the cuto cost level, the price equation (10) can






c    c
(13)
On the basis of equation (13) we make the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The cost structures and market structures of industries are related to the
degree of heterogeneity. The less the degree of cost heterogeneity, the more competitive the
structure of the industry.
Equation (13) shows that an increase in the number of rms implies that the rm with the
highest cost needs to have a cost parameter ever closer to average cost. Therefore, the cost
levels of rms become ever closer to each other with more rms in the market. Proposition
1 highlights how the market structure and the cost structure in the model are interrelated.
When we observe more competitive industries with more rms in equilibrium, this means
the cost levels of rms should be closer to each other.2
2Working with a more restricted model without entry, Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) nd similar results.
They show that the variance of the cost distribution and the Herndahl index of industry concentration are
positively related in a model with Cournot competition: a larger variance leads to more industry concentration.
From equation (13) above, it is clear that this result is more general, and holds with entry and exit.
5Next, free entry is allowed in the model. This will endogenise the number of rms n. Free
entry is introduced like in Melitz (2003). Firms have to pay a sunk entry cost fe to draw a
cost parameter ci randomly from a certain distribution of costs F (ci). Hence, uncertainty
about productivity is a barrier to entry for rms. They start to produce when they can
make positive operating prots. When they cannot make positive prots, they take their
loss and leave the market immediately. Producing rms leave the market with a certain
xed death probability  in each period or when market conditions have changed such that
they cannot make positive prots anymore. The sunk entry costs use labor. As free entry
leads to zero expected prots, all prot income on average is used to pay labor in the entry
sector. Therefore, total income in the economy is xed and equal to the amount of labor
(with wages normalized at 1).
The entry and exit process described leads to a zero cuto prot condition (ZCP) and a
free entry condition (FE). Together these two conditions can be added to the 'no free entry'
equilibrium equations, equations (10)-(12). The number of rms n can then be determined.
The ZCP can be derived from the fact that zero prot implies that price should be equal
to marginal cost. The FOC in equation (6) shows that this rm will reduce market share
to (just above) zero, to satisfy the rst order condition and make non-negative prot. One
nds as ZCP:
p = c (14)















[p(c)q (c)   cq (c)](c)dc = q
c Z
0
(c)(p   c)(c)dc (17)
(c) is the truncated pdf of all rms producing, (c) = 1
F(c)f (c).3 Continuing the deriva-
3Remember that q is the sum of sales of all rms in a Cournot sector
































The expectation appearing in equation (19) is a truncated expectation, i.e. Ec = E(cjc  c).
All expectations appearing in the remainder of the paper are the appropriate truncated ex-















The combined FE/ZCP equilibrium condition generates a stable price equilibrium. Rewriting













f (c)dc = fe (21)
Appendix A shows that the LHS of equation (21) rises in the market price from 0 to 1 when
the SOC is imposed, implying that there is a unique equilibrium.
The FE and ZCP can be used to solve for the cuto cost level. An explicit solution
requires the choice of an initial cost distribution. Once the cuto cost level c is known the
number of rms can be determined.
In steady state average cost is equal to expected cost,  c = E(cjc  c). So, the number
of rms is equal to:
n =
p







Equation (22) can be log dierentiated with respect to the market price p and the number
of rms n:
^ p =  





"Ec;p is the elasticity of equilibrium average costs with respect to the equilibrium market
price. Equation (23) implies the following:
7Proposition 2 When the equilibrium average cost varies less than proportionally with mar-
ket price (i.e. it falls slower with a corresponding drop in market price), a lower market
price is coincident with a larger number of rms. Or equivalently, a lower market price
is coincident with more rms when the average markup declines in equilibrium with falling
market prices. When the average cost varies more than proportionally in equilibrium with
lower market prices, a decreasing market price is coincident with less rms.
Proposition 2 follows from equation (22). As the market price is equal to the cuto cost level,
the relation between the market price and the number of rms depends on the distribution of
costs.4 Intuitively, a lower market price can either be caused by more rms in the market or
by more ecient rms in the market. When average costs respond less than proportionally
to the market price, a lower market price is caused by more rms in the market. When
average costs respond more than proportionally to the market price, a lower market price
is caused by more ecient rms in the market. In this situation a lower market price can
go along with less rms, because the least ecient rms are squeezed out of the market. A
related result can be derived on the eect of market size L on the number of rms.
Proposition 3 The number of rms rises in the size of the market L when equilibrium
average costs decline less than proportionally with equilibrium market price.
The combination of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 leads to the following corollaries about industrial
market structure and market size.
Corollary 1 The mix of price and concentration depends on the distribution of rm costs
(from Proposition 1). While larger markets imply lower prices, larger markets will only have
both more rms and lower prices as long as the equilibrium average cost varies less than
proportionally with equilibrium market price (equation 23). Larger markets will have more
concentration but also lower prices as long as the equilibrium average cost varies more than
proportionally with market price (again as dened in equation 23).
Corollary 2 The relationship of markups to market size also depends on cost heterogeneity.
Larger markets imply both larger markups and greater concentration when the equilibrium
4With a Pareto distribution, the truncated mean is linear in the truncation point. Therefore, the number
of rms will be xed. Simulations show that with a lognormal distribution sensible results can be generated
with a reasonable number of rms. Moreover, with a lognormal distribution the number of rms declines in
the market price.
8average cost varies more than proportionally with market price (as dened in equation 23),
and otherwise they imply lower markups and less concentration if equilibrium average cost
varies less than proportionally with market price. From Proposition 1, the latter case is more
likely to hold in industries with lower cost heterogeneity (linked to the technical distribution
of possible costs for a rm).
From Corollary 2, a systematic variation between market size, markups, and concentration
(for example in cross-country comparisons or markups and concentration) can be taken as
an indirect indicator of cost heterogeneity.












(( + 1)c   (   1)p)f (c)dc
< 0 (24)
The denominator is positive by the SOC in equation (7). Equation (24) shows that a larger
market leads to a lower market price. From Proposition 2 it is known that the number of
rms rises in the equilibrium market price when the decline in equilibrium average cost is
less than proportional to a decline in the equilibrium market price, which implies Proposition
2. Intuitively, a larger market can be served in two ways: through more rms or through
an increase in the sales per rm. Depending on the distribution of costs one or the other
dominates.5 The number of rms can increase with a larger market, but the number of rms
can also decrease with a larger market, when enough of the least ecient rms are squeezed
out of the market. This result contrasts with the monopolistic competition model of Melitz,
where the number of rms is linear in market size and the increase in market size is served
through a proportional increase in the number of rms. Here, concentration is an indicator
of underlying heterogeneity, as is price.
3 International Trade without Free Entry: the Short Run
We next introduce international trade between two countries s;r = H; F with markets
eectively segmented by trading costs. The countries are symmetric in size and technology
5With a Pareto distribution the number of rms is xed, so the increase in sales as a result of the larger
market is fully realized through more sales per rm. With a lognormal distribution, also the number of rms
changes considerably.
9sets. In particular we now introduce iceberg trade costs  in the Cournot sectors, meaning
that marginal cost for production and delivery is increased at the rate  relative to production
and delivery for the domestic market. There are no xed or beachhead trade costs, and the
trading costs preclude return exports. We do not have free entry (we return to this in the
next section) though existing rms can exit. This can be seen as a short-run or free-exit
case. We focus on the impact of increased globalization (i.e. falling trade costs). Consistent
with the empirical literature (Tybout 2001), increased globalization through falling trade
costs means that average markups from domestic sales decline and average markups from
exporting sales rise with falling trade costs.
Under our assumptions about trade costs, the equilibrium market price in the represen-














and ns = nds + nxs. In equation (25), there is a direct
eect of trade liberalization on the market price: exporting rms have lower costs and
therefore average costs decline. And there is an indirect eect, because rms producing for
the domestic market can disappear and exporting rms can appear on the market. It can be
shown that this indirect eect is 0 at the margin (see appendix B). Therefore, the relative












Variables with a hat denote relative changes, b x = dx
x . The elasticity of the market price with












From equations (26) and (27) we make the following proposition:
Proposition 4 With a decline in trade cost , the market price also declines.
Equation (26) shows that a decline of trade costs  drives down the market price. The
10domestic cuto marginal cost is equal to the market price, so it also declines.
Several other Propositions can be made on the eect of trade liberalization.
Proposition 5 Some of the least productive rms are squeezed out of the market with a
decline in trade cost .
How many rms are squeezed out of the market depends on the price distribution of the
rms, i.e. it depends on how far the highest cost rms are from the old market price.
Proposition 6 More of the remaining rms export with a decline in trade cost .








xr = b Ps   b  =  (1   "p;)b  (29)
Proposition 7 (Average) markups from domestic sales decline and (Average) markups from
exporting sales rise with a decline in trade cost .
Markups of all domestic sales decline, as the costs of the rms remain equal, whereas the
market price declines. Markups of the exporting rms rise with trade liberalization, as the
eect of the declining trade costs dominates the eect of the decrease in market price in the





^ mixs = ^ Pr   ^  = ("p;   1)^  (31)
The eect on average domestic and exporting markups can be calculated as well. The
markups of rms are weighted by market shares in calculating average markups, so as to

























6Implicitly it is assumed that the probability of rms to be in the market is equal for all marginal costs,
i.e. that the distribution of costs is uniform.
11Relative changes of the average exporting and domestic markups are equal to:



















(1   "p;)^  (35)
So, average markups from domestic sales decline and average markups from exporting sales
rise.7 Declining markups in the domestic market t well with empirical ndings reported in
Tybout (2001) from developing countries. Various studies nd that more import competition
goes along with declining markups.
As in almost any model of international trade (for example Armington) rms increase
their market share on the exporting market and their market share is reduced in domestic
markets. But the relative gain and loss of exporters and domestic producers displays an
interesting pattern:
Proposition 8 Large low cost rms lose less market share on the domestic market than
small high cost rms and small high cost exporting rms gain more market share on the
export market than large low cost rms








("p;   1)b  (37)
Therefore small rms lose relatively more market share on the domestic market and small
rms gain relatively more market share on the exporting market than large rms. So, more
ecient big rms do not gain more from improved market access abroad than less ecient
small rms. Essentially, big rms already have a strong position in an exporting market, so
they cannot grow as much as a result of trade liberalization as small rms.8
7Indirect eects because domestic producing rms disappear from the market and exporting rms enter
the market are 0, because the averages are weighted by market shares and market shares are zero for entering
and exiting rms.
8This set of results, related in particular to Proposition 8, has interesting political economy implications
12Consider next the welfare eect of trade liberalization. This is complicated by the fact
that income is endogenous as it depends on prot income in the imperfect competition sector.
With free entry prot income is driven to zero, but in the no free entry case prot income is
non-zero and varies.
Welfare in country s is equal to utility in that country:







s is total prot income in the economy. Elaborating upon this equation (see appendix B)
assuming that both countries are equal, one arrives at the following expression:
W =
L(Qp + p)











welfare towards trade costs  from equation (39) and treating the price and the market share




Qp + p  
p




p + Q~ c
d~ c (40)
The rst term in (40) is the welfare gain through a decline in price. As expected the gain for
the consumer from lower prices outweighs the loss of a lower prot income with lower prices.
The second term measures the possible gain from trade liberalization of lower costs leading
to a higher prot income. Elaborating on the cost eect, d~ c, one gets:
^ W =  

p
Qp + p  
p

















beyond the scope of this paper. As trade liberalization progresses, the dominant domestic rms gain relative
domestic position (known as "standing" in the antidumping and trade safeguards literature). Assuming that
lobbying eciency is a function of industry concentration, increased concentration of rms with standing (i.e.
the domestic industry) may increase their ability to organize and seek protection or relief against further
drops in trade costs and foreign competition.
13^ W =  

p
Qp + p  
p

























Equation (41) and (42) can be interpreted as follows. In both equations is the rst term
on the RHS again the welfare gain from a lower market price. The second term on the
RHS measures the eect on prot income through changed costs. In both (41) and (42) the
rst term between the second brackets measures the gain from the declining market share of
domestic producing rms. The second term between the second brackets measures the loss
from the rising market share of exporting rms. The third term measures the welfare gain
from lower trade costs with trade liberalization.
Proposition 9 Like in Brander and Krugman (1983) the welfare eect of trade liberaliza-
tion can be negative at rst when the tari is reduced from a prohibitive level, due to the
increased costs of cross-hauling associated with the rst units traded. However, unlike Bran-
der and Krugman, the welfare eect can also be positive when the tari is reduced from a
prohibitive level.
Unlike in the model of Brander and Krugman (1983) the welfare eect of trade liberalization
when the tari is reduced from a prohibitive level is ambiguous. It depends on the cost
structure of rms whether the welfare eect is positive or negative. It can be shown under
what condition the welfare eect is negative in general, but this condition is cumbersome
and does not lend itself to any interpretation. (See footnote 9 below for proof by example).9
The ambiguity vanishes for low trade costs.
Proposition 10 The welfare eect of trade liberalization is unambiguously positive when
the tari is negligible or small, like in Brander and Krugman (1983)
9As proof of ambiguity, we can oer two examples to show that the welfare eect can go both ways. First
an example of a negative welfare eect from trade liberalization. Suppose there are two identical countries
with each three rms. They have marginal costs of 1, 1 and 2. The autarky market price will be 2. The
iceberg trade costs are equal to 2. This implies that 2 rms can export, but with a market share of 0.
Substitution elasticity  is equal to 1. Equation (42) can be applied to show that a marginal reduction of the




1+Q. An example where the welfare eect is positive is the following. Again
there are two identical countries with each three rms. Marginal costs are 1, 2 and 3. The autarky market
price is 3. Iceberg trade costs are 3. So, only one rm can export. Furthermore, the substitution elasticity 
is 1, so utility is Cobb-Douglas. There are two sectors in the economy and the Cournot sector has CES-weight
(Cobb-Douglas parameter) . When the tari is reduced from the prohibitive level, the welfare eect from




9 So, when the Cournot sector is small enough ( < 1=5), the welfare
eect of trade liberalization is positive.
14Proposition 10 follows immediately from equation (42). When the tari is equal to 1, the
rst two terms between brackets in equation (42) are equal. So, only negative terms are left
and therefore the welfare eect from trade liberalization is positive. Brander and Krugman
(1983) only show that the welfare eect is positive when the tari is negligible. In the present
heterogeneous productivity model one can say more on when the welfare eect is positive.
Elaborating upon equation (42), the following expression can be derived for the welfare eect
of trade liberalization (see appendix B):
^ W =  

p
Qp + p  
p





p + Q~ c
n
p2 (n   1)
nx X
i=1
ci [nc (c + p   2ci) + (n   1)V ar(ci)]^  (43)
In equation (43) c and V ar(ci) are respectively the mean and variance of the marginal costs


























Note that the summation in equation (43) is over all the terms between brackets. It can also






(n   1)(n   1)
(46)
From equation (43) and (46) the following statements can be made:
Proposition 11 The welfare eect of trade liberalization is positive when the exporting rms
are ecient relative to average market costs. In particular, the welfare eect is unambigu-
ously positive when all exporting rms have marginal costs inclusive of trade costs lower than
the average of market price and average costs.
Proposition 1 The welfare eect of trade liberalization is positive when the coecient of
variation of the cost distribution is larger than the square root of n
(n 1)(n 1).
15Proposition 11 follows from equation (43). When c + p is larger than 2ci all terms in
equation (43) will be negative and hence the welfare eect of trade liberalization will be
positive. Intuitively, when the exporting rms are productive, their gain in market share at
the expense of domestic producing rms represents a welfare gain. More productive rms
replace less productive rms. But when the exporting rms' marginal costs inclusive of trade
costs are larger than the marginal costs of the domestic producing rms, the shift in market
share towards exporting rms can represent a loss. In some cases this loss can be larger than
the welfare gain due to lower prices and lower trade costs, as shown by the example above.
Proposition 1 follows from (46). It can be interpreted as follows. When the variance
of rms' costs is large relative to average rms' costs, the fraction of relatively inecient
exporting rms will be small. So, the welfare loss from an increasing market share of relatively
inecient exporting rms will be smaller than the welfare gain from a decreasing market
share of domestic producing inecient rms. The next section shows that the welfare eect
from trade liberalization is unambiguously positive with free entry.
4 International Trade with Free Entry: the Long Run
In the free entry case, the welfare eect of trade liberalization depends entirely on the eect
of liberalization on the market price as prot income remains zero. Showing that trade
liberalization leads to a lower market price is sucient to show that liberalization raises
welfare. In this section we focus on market conditions with falling trade costs based on the
combined ZCP and FE conditions. Trade liberalization does indeed lead to a lower market
price and thus to higher welfare.
Firms can make prots from domestic and exporting sales, if they are productive enough
to export. Average prot is dened as:








~ ds and ~ xsare the expected prots from respectively domestic and exporting sales, condi-
16tional upon entry. There are two ZCP for domestic and exporting sales:
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Elaborating on expected prots as in the closed economy case, generates the following equi-




























































To determine the impact of trade costs on the market price, one can totally dierentiate the
free entry condition in equation (50) towards the cuto cost level (which equals the market
price) and trade costs. Both the impact of sectoral trade liberalization and trade liberal-
ization in all Cournot sectors can be addressed. The eect of sectoral trade liberalization
on the market price is larger. Totally dierentiating towards p and  one nds the follow-
ing expressions for the eect on market price of sectoral and economywide liberalization
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17"p;;sect;FE and "p;;nat;FE are the elasticities of the market price with respect to trade costs
in the free entry case with sectoral and nationwide trade liberalization respectively. By the
SOC in equation (7) the denominator in both equations is positive and hence the fraction is
positive as well. This gives rise to the following Proposition:
Proposition 12 Trade liberalization or otherwise falling trade costs  leads to a lower mar-
ket price and higher welfare in the free entry case.
Welfare rises when the market price of q declines as income is xed with free entry.10 Hence,
welfare rises in this model as a result of trade liberalization. By Proposition 2 a lower market
price goes along with more or less rms in the market depending on how much average costs
decline when the market price declines. This result can be combined with Proposition 12.
The implication is that the lower market price as a result of trade liberalization can go
along with more but also with less rms in the market, depending on how many of the
least ecient rms are squeezed out of the market. Hence, the conventional insight of the
reciprocal dumping model that trade liberalization leads to lower market prices, because
there are more rms in the market has to be relaxed. Trade liberalization can also lead to
less rms in the market and still decrease market prices, because enough of the least ecient
rms are squeezed out of the market.
The various eects of trade liberalization described in the section on 'no free entry' can
also be examined in the free entry case. The following eects of trade liberalization are
found:
Proposition 13 The least productive rms get squeezed out of the market with falling trade
costs  in the free entry case.
Proposition 13 follows from the fact that the cuto cost level is equal to the market price. A
lower market price implies that the highest cost producers have to leave the market. Next,
the eect on market shares from domestic and exporting sales is calculated.
Proposition 14 Market shares from domestic sales decline and market shares from export-
ing sales rise with declining trade costs  in the free entry case.
10U =
L
PU , ^ U =  
Qp1 
1+Qp1  ^ p
18Log-dierentiating the expressions for market shares, dened implicitly in equations (9) and






















(1   "p;;FE)^  (55)
The market share from domestic sales declines for all rms. Therefore, the market share
from exporting sales should rise, either because more rms can export or because the market
share of rms that already exported should rise. The market share of rms that enter the
exporting market is zero. Therefore, the market share of rms already exporting should rise.
Applying this line of reasoning, equation (55) implies that the elasticity of the market price
with respect to iceberg trade costs in equations (52) and (53) is smaller than 1. This result
is useful in the remainder.
Proposition 15 The elasticity of the market price with respect to trade costs is between 0
and 1.
Proposition 15 can immediately be used in the following two Propositions.
Proposition 16 More of the remaining rms are able to export with declining trade cost 
in the free-entry case.
The exporting cuto cost level c
x is equal to
p
. Log-dierentiating shows that the exporting
cuto cost level declines with trade liberalization, implying that more rms can export:
^ c
x = ^ p   ^  = ("p;;FE   1)^  (56)
Proposition 17 Markups from domestic sales decline and markups from exporting sales
rise for remaining individual rms with declining trade cost  in the free entry case.




c , respectively. Log
dierentiating shows that markups from domestic sales decline and markups from exporting
sales rise with trade liberalization:
^ md = ^ p = "p;;FE^  (57)
^ mx = ^ p   ^  = ("p;;FE   1)^  (58)
19While we have clear results for individual rms, the impact on the average across rms
depends on the underlying structure of cost distributions, much like the closed economy case
in Section 2. Basically, market expansion through globalization with falling trade costs  is
analogous to market expansion in the closed economy case. We summarize this point with
the following proposition:
Proposition 18 While deeper integration through falling trade cost  implies falling prices,
the impact on average markups across rms and average rm size (whether they rise or fall
on average) depends on the underlying distribution of costs.








































Log-dierentiating these expressions shows that average markups from domestic sales decline
and average markups from exporting sales rise:
















































5("p;;FE   1) (62)
The terms in
f(p)p
F(p) represent the increased probability weight of all rms in the market,
when the cuto point declines as a result of trade liberalization. Basically, as in the closed
or integrated economy case, the eect of trade liberalization (which is somewhat analogous to
market expansion) on average domestic and exporting markups is ambiguous and depends
on the cost distribution of productivities. As in the closed economy case, larger or more
integrated markets imply lower prices, but these lower prices may involve lower or higher
average markups. It depends on the structure of cost heterogeneity.
20Similarly, as in the case of the closed or integrated economy, we nd a similar result for
average rm size (and hence for concentration as well). Average rm size from domestic

































































































































p (c)dc[1   "p;;FE] (66)
So, like with average markups, the eect on average domestic and exporting rm sales
depends on the distribution of costs.
5 Asymmetric Countries
So far we have focused on strict symmetry across countries in terms of technology sets and
size. In this section the symmetry assumptions are relaxed. Three sets of results are derived.
First, we show that unilateral liberalization can lead to higher prices in the liberalizing
21country in the long run. Second, the impact of country size and distance on the probability
of zero trade and on exporting unit values is derived. Third, we present the Ricardian model
with productivity dierences as a nested model of the present framework.
The setup in this section is as follows. There are two countries s;r = H; F. The
countries display dierences in country size, in trade costs and in their technology sets (cost
distributions). Productivity dierences are modeled by a dierent lower frontier for the






































































5.1 asymmetries in trade costs
Unilateral liberalization can be studied using the above two equations. Assuming that the
two countries are equal in all respects except their trade costs, one can log-linearize the above
system of equations towards market prices ps, pr and trade costs sr, rs. Appendix D shows



















dcds, dcdr, dcxs, dcxr, dcxs and dcxr are respectively the marginal eects on expected prot















xs (c)srcf (c)dc (73)
The variables in r are dened accordingly. The marginal eects from domestic price changes
on expected prot dcds and dcdr are larger than the marginal eects from exporting prices
on expected prot dcxs and dcxr, because the domestic market shares d are larger than
the exporting market shares x and the integration frontier is larger for the domestic cost
variables than for the exporting cost variables.
Equation (26) shows that in the short run unilateral liberalization leads to a lower market
price in the importing country. Equations (69) and (70) show that unilateral liberalization
in country s , i.e. a negative rs, decreases the market price in the exporting country s and
increases the market price in the importing country r in the long run. This gives rise to the
following Proposition:
Proposition 19 Unilateral liberalization causes a decreasing market price in the liberalizing
(importing) country in the short run. In the long run, however, the market price in the
importing country increases and the market price in the exporting country decreases. Hence,
the welfare eect of unilateral liberalization is negative in the importing country and positive
in the exporting country.
The short-run eect of unilateral liberalization is as one would expect. The long-run impact is
due to industrial delocation eects.11 Due to unilateral liberalization in country s, expected
prot rises in country r. Therefore, there will be more entry in country r. At the same time,
the decreasing market price in country s reduces entry in that country. The eect of this
entry and exit is that the market price in the exporting country s declines and the market
price in the importing country r rises.12
11With a dierent model, but also characterized by cost heterogeneity, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) obtain
a similar result.
12Mathematically, the reason for the declining market price in the exporting country s and the rising market
235.2 asymmetric size, distance, and zero trade 
ows
We next focus on the impact of distance and importer country size on the probability of
zero trade and on export prices. We concentrate on country r as the importer country.
First consider the eect of a change in distance. We take as proxy a change in trade costs.
Equations (69) and (70) show the eect of lower trade costs on market prices. Equalizing














^  = "ps ;UC^  (75)
Unless country sizes dier a lot leading to strong delocation eects, market prices decline
with lower trade costs in the importing country r. Using the same reasoning as in the equal
country case, one can prove that the elasticity of price wrt trade costs, "pr ;UC, has to be
between 0 and 1. Market shares of domestic producers in country r and exporters from






















(1   "pr ;UC)^  (77)
When distance becomes smaller, the market price in country r, pr, declines (if there are no
strong delocation eects). As a result the domestic market shares in the importing country,
idr decline. Hence, the ixs have to rise to get a total market share of 1 and therefore
0 < "pr ;UC < 1. This implies that pr= will decline, as the denominator  declines at a
larger rate than the numerator pr. pr= is both the export price and the cuto cost value
for exports from country s to country r. When the cuto cost value of exports declines,
the probability of zero trade rises. It becomes more likely that no rm is able to export
price in the importing country r is the following: the marginal eect on expected prot of a changing domestic
price, as represented by cdr and cds, is larger than the eect on expected prot of a changing price in the
export market, represented by cxr and cxs. Therefore, when the expected prot from exports in country s
rise due to unilateral liberalization in country r, the FE can be restored by decreasing prices in the export
market r and/or in the domestic market s. The prices in the two markets should go in opposite directions,
however, because the FE in foreign should also be satised. Because the marginal eect of domestic price
changes is larger, the domestic price (in s) has to decrease and the exporting price (in r) has to rise. With
decreasing export prices (in r) and rising domestic prices (in s), the FE's could never be satised.
24protably. Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 20 A lower distance between trading partners leads to both a lower probability
of zero trade 
ows and a lower fob export price.
Consider next the eect of importing country size on the probability of zero trade 
ows
and export price. The combined FE/ZCP equations, (68) and (67), are log dierentiated
wrt pr, ps and Lr, leading to13:
^ pr =  
dcds dr   dcrx sx
(dcdrdcds   dcrxdcsx)qr
^ Lr (78)
^ ps =  
dcsx dr   dcdr sx
(dcdrdcds   dcrxdcsx)qs
^ Lr (79)
dcdr, dcxr, dcds and dcxs are respectively the marginal eects on expected prot from domestic
and exporting price changes in country r and country s, as dened in equations (71) and
(72) for country s. As the eect of domestic price changes on expected prot are larger,
because market shares in the domestic market are larger, the denominator in both equations
(78) and (79) is positive. When productivity dierences between the two countries are not
too large, expected prots from domestic sales of producers in country r,  dr are larger than
expected prots from exporting sales of exporters from country s,  sx. This implies that
the numerator is also positive. Hence, the market price in country r decreases in its market
size. The fob price of exporters from country s, pr=, also decreases. Therefore, we have the
following result:
Proposition 21 A larger market size of the importing country leads to a higher probability
of zero trade 
ows and lower fob export prices.
Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) compare dierent models of international trade on their
predictions of the eect of distance and importing country size on the probability of zero trade

ows and fob prices. From table 1 in their paper it is clear that the Cournot model in this
paper generates the same predictions as the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model in this regard.
The predictions are dierent from the model proposed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007),
which seems to align with the empirical ndings presented in their paper. However, whereas
13Derivation available upon request. The derivation is similar to the log dierentiation wrt pr, ps and 
discussed in appendix D.
25the model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) contains product dierentiation and quality
dierences, the oligopoly model in this paper describes a setting with homogeneous products.
Therefore, the predictions from this model should be tested with data from homogeneous
goods sectors and not with a dataset of all sectors as Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) do.
Intuitively, the dierent predictions can be clearly explained from the dierent modeling
setups. Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) adapt the Melitz rm heterogeneity model to allow
for quality dierences. More productive rms charge higher instead of lower prices, because
they sell higher quality products involving also higher marginal costs. The probability of zero
trade 
ows rises with distance in our model and in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). A larger
distance makes it in both models more likely that trade costs are too high and that no rm
is productive enough to sell protably in the export market. The probability of zero trade

ows rises in importing country size in our model and declines in importing country size in
Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). The intuition in our model is that a larger market leads to
tougher competition, more entry of rms and lower prices. Henceforth, it becomes harder
to export to that market. The model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) features xed export
costs. In a larger market it is easier to earn these xed costs back and therefore also the less
productive rms with lower quality and lower price can sell in the market protably.14
A larger distance leads to higher fob export prices in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and
lower export prices in our model. In both models a larger distance makes it harder to export
and therefore only more productive rms can export. In our model with homogeneous goods
more productive rms charge lower prices, whereas in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) they
charge higher prices, because the quality of the good is larger. Finally, the export price
declines in both models in the importing country size. The reason is dierent, however.
In our model prices are lower in a larger market due to intenser competition and for given
trade costs this leads to lower export prices as well. In Baldwin and Harrigan (2007)
it is easier to earn back the xed export costs in a larger market. Therefore, also lower
quality, lower price exporters can sell protably and the average export price will be lower.
It could be an interesting exercise to see if the predictions of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007)
on the probability of trade zeros and export zeros carry through in a sample of sectors with
14A larger market also implies a lower price index and therefore less sales for an individual rm, making it
more dicult to sell protably in the export market. Apparently the direct eect of market size dominates.
An eect of market size on prot margins is absent in the model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) , because
they work with CES and thus xed markups.
26homogeneous goods or if our model of oligopoly predicts better.
5.3 technology asymmetries
With technological asymmetries, the Ricardian comparative advantage can be treated as a
nested case of the present model. Comparative advantage is introduced in this case as follows.
There are two types of sectors, country s has a comparative advantage in the A sectors and
country r has a comparative advantage in the B sectors. Comparative advantage is modeled
by the integration frontiers of the initial distribution of productivities. As only the lower
integration frontiers c

appears in the relevant ZCP and FE equations, attention can be









sA is the lower integration frontier in country s in the A sectors, i.e. in the sectors in which
country s has a comparative advantage. To show that Ricardian comparative advantage is
a nested case of the model, the distribution of productivities within a country is squeezed,
i.e. the heterogeneity of rms is reduced. The productivity dierences between countries
remain. When the within country distribution of productivities collapses to a single point,
the model converges either to a Ricardian model with perfect competition or a Brander and
Krugman (1983) Cournot model with specialization, depending on whether the sunk entry
costs disappear or not.
Before the distribution of productivities is narrowed, the following relations between the
lower integration frontiers, market prices and trade costs apply:
c
sA < c
rA < prA= < prA (82)
c
sA < c
rA < psA= < psA (83)
The focus in the discussion is on sector A, because sector B is just its mirror image with
a comparative advantage for country r. Equation (82) ensures that at least some rms in
country s can export in their comparative advantage sector A and that at least some rms
27in country r can produce for the domestic market. Equation (83) guarantees that some rms
in country r can also export in their comparative disadvantage market A and that rms in
country s can sell in their domestic market in their comparative advantage sector A. Hence,
there is two-way trade in sector A.
Next, suppose that the distribution of productivities becomes more homogenous. This
can be seen as a narrowing of the distribution of productivities. The lower integration
frontier moves up and the upper integration frontier moves down. However, only the lower
integration frontier appears in the combined ZCP/FE condition, so mathematically a more
homogenous productivity distribution comes down to an increase in the lowest cost.
Uncertainty about productivity is a barrier to entry for rms. The sunk entry costs are
dependent on uncertainty about the prospective productivity. Firms have to incur research
costs to get rid of the uncertainty about their productivity. This interpretation of the sunk
entry costs implies that a squeezing of the productivity distribution decreases the sunk
entry costs. The combined ZCP/FEs in a S sector are given in equations (67) and (68) (with
symmetric trade costs). Log dierentiating these expressions towards market prices, the lower
integration frontiers and the sunk entry costs shows what happens when the distributions of






































































r)^ cr = fe ^ fe (85)
The eect of squeezing the distribution of productivities on market prices depends on the
size of the change in the sunk entry cost fe. When this change is small, the market prices
will have to rise to keep on satisfying the free entry condition.
Suppose that the distribution of productivities becomes concentrated in one point. Then
two questions remain. First, does the model converge to a Ricardian comparative advantage
28model with perfect competition or a Brander and Krugman Cournot model? Second, will
there be full specialization across countries? To address the rst question, where the model
converges to depends on what happens with sunk entry costs. When some sunk entry costs
remain, because uncertainty about productivity is not the only source of the sunk costs, the
model remains Cournot. The market price becomes higher than marginal costs to cover the
sunk entry costs and the number of rms is limited. When uncertainty is the only source of
sunk costs and so when there are no sunk costs left when the distribution of productivities
collapses to a single point, the model converges to a perfect competition Ricardian model.
Marginal cost will be equal to the market price and the number of rms becomes innite as
is clear from equation (13).15
Proposition 22 When the distribution of productivities becomes concentrated in one point
the model either converges to a Brander & Krugman Cournot model or a Ricardian perfect
competition model depending on the presence of sunk (or xed) costs. Two-way trade emerges
either from cost heterogeneity or the presence of sunk (or xed) entry costs.
Whether there will be full specialization depends on the relation between market prices and
marginal cost levels that emerges. There will be full specialization when:
c
rA < psA= < c
sA (86)
crA < prA < c
sA (87)
The model converges either to a Cournot model or a Ricardian perfect competition model
depending on the presence of sunk costs. There is no strict link between the appearance
of full specialization and the type of market competition that emerges. There can be full
specialization with Cournot competition when productivity dierences are large enough.
Also, the Ricardian model does not imply full specialization. A country could still produce
for its own market in the Ricardian model in its comparative disadvantage sector when
trade costs are large enough. But two way trade is only possible with Cournot competition.
Moreover, full specialization is more likely in the Ricardian model without xed costs, because
market prices become equal to marginal costs (inclusive of trade costs) in that case.
15It should be noted that there are no wage dierences in the present model. Modeling wage dierences,
possibly along the line of the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson model of Ricardian trade with a continuum of
goods and technology asymmetries, constitutes a possible extension of the present model
29Proposition 23 When the distribution of productivities collapses to a single point, full spe-
cialization is more likely with lower trade costs, a larger cost dierence between countries
and the absence of sunk costs.
6 Summary and Conclusions
We have developed a model of trade with endogeneity in key features of market structure
linked to heterogeneous cost structures under Cournot competition. This approach leads to a
set of results familiar from the recent Bertrand and Chamberlinian monopolistic competition
literature with cost heterogeneity. Market prices decline, the least productive rms get
squeezed out of the market and exporting rms gain market share when trade costs fall.
These results hold in cases with and without free entry. Welfare rises in both cases with
trade liberalization, unless the trade barriers decline from a prohibitive level in the short run.
With asymmetric countries, the Brander & Krugman's (1983) reciprocal dumping model and
the Ricardian comparative advantage model can be nested as special cases. Furthermore,
delocation eects are present in the asymmetric trade cost case: unilateral liberalization leads
in the long run to higher prices in the liberalizing country, because rms delocate to the other
country. Possible extensions of the model are the introduction of wage dierences between
the two countries, political economy applications (as domestic industry concentration is
endogenous to the evolution of trade policy), and specifying a distribution of costs enabling
simulations with the model with more countries and more sectors.
The model provides insight into zero trade 
ows and the pattern of export prices. The
probability of zero trade 
ows rises with distance and with the size of the importer country,
while fob export prices decrease with distance and with the size of the importer country. The
model also oers insight into cross-country dierences in markups, concentration, and prices
across industries controlling for dierent degrees of openness. In particular, the variation
across industries and countries in markups, concentration, and pricing structures is also a
function of country or market size and the variation in cost heterogeneity across industries.
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31Appendix A Basic Model
The appendices show how to derive equations from the main text.
Equation 7: SOC











Substituting the rst order condition, i = 
p ci









































( + 1)ci   (   1)p
p
Combined FEZCP leads to stable equilibrium
Average prot unconditional upon entry in equation (21) can be dierentiated with respect
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( + 1)c   (   1)p
p

f (c)dc > 0 (A.2)
The integrand in (A.2) is positive by the SOC in equation (7), hence average prot uncon-
ditional upon entry rises in the market price. This re
ects two opposite forces: rstly, a
decline in the market price leads to larger market sales in the entire industry and thus a
larger prot conditional upon entry. Secondly, a decline in market price decreases the aver-
age prot margin (weighted by the market share  and by the probability ). This is due
to a decline in the prot margin p   c and to the declining market share. The second eect
32dominates the rst eect. Hence, the model generates a stable equilibrium market price.
Appendix B The Limited Entry Case
Equation 26: Direct and indirect eect of trade liberalization in short-run free exit case
The market price is dened in equation (25)
ps =





































exp is the number of exporting rms that are entering the market because of the change
in taris and dom is the number of domestic producing rms that have to leave the mar-
ket. These rms that are entering the export market and leaving the domestic market all
have marginal costs (inclusive of trade costs for the exporters) equal to the market price.
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So, the eect through a change in the number of rms is zero. The direct eect remains
which is positive. Using relative changes, one arrives at equation (26) in the main text.
Equation 39: Welfare in free exit case








Labor income is xed. All Cournot-sectors are equal. Therefore total prot  is equal to:
s = Qs = Q








s is prot income in one Cournot-sector. To proceed one needs to assume that the two
34countries are equal. This implies that (B.4) can be rewritten as:
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is dened as the market share weighted average
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Substituting equation (B.7) into equation (B.3), one nds the following expression for welfare,





























Equation 40: Relative Welfare Change in free exit case
Log-dierentiating equation (B.8) with respect to trade costs , treating the market price p,




Qp + p ^ p  
p^ p + Qd~ c
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p + Q~ c
d~ c (B.9)
Equation 43 and 46: Conditions for positive welfare eect of trade liberalization
Starting from equation (B.9), one can elaborate on the term d~ c. Using equations (9), (36),

































































































































































































, also implying that, p = n
n 1c can
be used to rewrite (B.11) as:
d~ c =
n
p2 (n   1)






























































Substituting equation (B.13) into equation (B.12) leads to the following expression:
d~ c =
2n
p2 (n   1)
"
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Bringing the summation of
nx P
i=1
ci outside the brackets in equation (B.14) gives the nal
expression for d~ c in equation (43) in the main text:
d~ c =
n
p2 (n   1)
nx X
i=1
ci [nc (c + p   2ci) + (n   1)V ar(ci)]^ 
Inequality (46) can be derived as follows. The d~ c part of the welfare change in equation (B.9)
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p2 (n   1)

































The third term between brackets in equation (B.15), the gain through lower trade costs,

























































































































(46) in the main text.
Appendix C Free Entry Case
Equation 52: Eect of sectoral trade liberalization on market price in free entry case
























f (c)dc = fe (C.1)
Totally dierentiating equation (C.1) towards p and  and considering the eect through the















































5d = 0 (C.2)









































Using the denition of market shares and multiplying by
p
 generates equation (52) in the
main text.
Equation 53: Eect of economywide trade liberalization on market price in the free entry
case
The eect of economywide liberalization, also takes into account the eect through the price
index PU. Totally dierentiating the combined ZCP/FE in equation (C.1) towards p and 





















































































5d = 0 (C.4)
39One can calculate @PU
@p = PU
Qp 
Qp1 +1. Furthermore, the unconditional prots from domestic




F(p) ~ x. Rewriting the rst
term as in the sectoral liberalization derivation, one arrives at the following expression with












A + B + C
^  (C.5)
Equations 65 and 66: Derivatives of average revenues with respect to trade costs
Average domestic and exporting revenues are dened in the main text in equations (63) and



















































































































































































































p (c)dc["p;   1] (C.7)
Appendix D Asymmetric Countries Case
Equations 69 and 70: Eects of unilateral trade liberalization on market prices

























































fr (c)dc = fe
(D.2)















































f (c)dcdsr = 0 (D.3)
Rewriting equation (D.3) in terms of relative changes and adding the equivalent expression






























rscxr (c)f (c)dc^ rs = 0
(D.5)
Dening the marginal eects dcds, dcdr, dcxs, dcxr, dcxs and dcxr as in the main text,
equations (D.4) and (D.5) can be solved for ^ ps, ^ pr as a function of ^ sr and ^ rs, leading to
equations (69) and (70) in the main text.
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